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INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INSOLVENCY LAW: Is THE UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY AN ANSWER FOR BRAZIL?
(AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ITS
BENEFITS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE)
Fernando Locatelli*
I. INTRODUCTION
HE promotion of free international trade and the development of
global financial markets have resulted in significant changes to the
structure and dynamics of commercial relations in the last three
decades. International integration among economies has been a useful
tool for achieving economic growth. Consequently, most economies are
interdependent, and business has been made among traders located in
different jurisdictions.
Investors and enterprises have moved toward new boundaries seeking
new markets. Companies have radically changed their structures as a
means of maximizing profits. Nowadays multinational companies are a
common feature, owning assets and assuming obligations in various coun-
tries. As a result, bankruptcy and reorganization proceedings are no
longer restricted to the domestic arena.
The conflict between different legal systems has affected parties' rights,
creating uncertainty. This effect has happened because national bank-
ruptcy laws have been inadequate in efficiently addressing the necessities
required by international insolvencies in the new economic arena, in-
creasing transaction costs to all parties. As a response, a model law was
designed by UNCITRAL to assist countries in developing harmonic pro-
cedural rules of coordination and assistance among jurisdictions in cross-
border insolvency cases as a means of producing "[g]reater legal certainty
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for trade and investment."'
In this context, after analyzing the economic role of insolvency law and
the rationale of international trade, this paper intends to demonstrate the
legal and economic benefits derived from the enactment of the Model
Law in insolvencies with an international element, as well as whether the
new chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code may result in a better insol-
vency regime with economic advantages. Finally, this paper will examine
the obstacles derived from the lack of rules in Brazil for international
insolvency and whether the Model Law might equip Brazil with more
efficient tools as a way to create a better legal environment for interna-
tional trade.
II. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INSOLVENCY LAW
A. THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INSOLVENCY
International commerce between countries has occurred throughout
history, especially in the mercantilist period of the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. Nations initiated trading, seeking new market opportunities.
It was just after World War II, however, that the most significant process
of globalization arose.2 Nations realized that promotion of free interna-
tional trade and the development of a global financial market 3 would be
mutually beneficial to economic and social progress.4 This gave place to
the so-called Bretton Woods institutions such as the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Development and Re-
construction (World Bank).
The implementation of the process of liberalizing trade policies in the
late 1980s, driven principally by the IMF and the World Bank, has under-
gone considerable economic expansion and social advancement in those
countries that have been willing to integrate themselves into the world
economy. Nations have moved towards free trade and have significantly
reduced trade barriers. Based on the economic logic of flow of goods,
services, and capital, 5 the international integration between economies
1. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, at 2, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1999) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL Model Law].
2. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000).
3. Hal S. Scott, International Finance: Rule Choices for Global Financial Markets, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 361, 369 (Andrew T.
Guzman & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 2007).
[I]t seems clear that better financial systems do increase growth by pro-
viding information about possible investments that enable more efficient
allocation of capital, by monitoring investments and insisting on high
standards of corporate governance, by facilitating the trading, diversifica-
tion and management of risk, by mobilizing and pooling savings and by
easing the exchange of goods and services. Id.
4. JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (4th ed., 2002).
5. THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 27 (Rainer Grote &
Thilo Marauhn eds., 2006).
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has been a useful tool in achieving sustainable economic growth in both
developed and developing countries.
This is especially true in the case of Latin American countries such as
Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, where financial and trade liberalization has
radically changed the economy. Instead of protection measures and im-
port substitution policies maintained by exchange controls, the strategy
was adjusted through an open market and by efficient domestic financing
played by local financial institutions. The strategy has benefitted local
economies with a continuous flow of international investments. 6 Equally,
it has created an efficient way to attract new industries, technologies, and
transfer of know-how for developing countries.
As a result, most economies are now interdependent and open to
trade. 7 The standardization of legal norms and the adoption of conven-
tions such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods8 and the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts9 by agents and countries integrating into the
global marketplace were necessary to produce certainty and predictabil-
ity in terms of trade operations worldwide. The globalization process has
also created economic blocks in almost all regions of the globe, such as
the European Economic Area, NAFTA, 10 and Mercosur11 as a legal
means of further integrating various economies and countries as well as
improving social standards.
In this context, more than ever, multinational corporations and the fi-
nancial market have played an important role as major parties in the in-
ternational economy. 12 Companies are no longer restricted to their local
In the 1950s, deregulation and liberalisation [sic] began to combine with
technological and institutional innovation to breach many of the barriers
separating national currencies and monetary systems. In a cumulative
process driven by the pressures of domestic and international competi-
tion, the range of market opportunities has gradually widened for bor-
rowers and investors alike. The result has been a remarkable growth of
capital mobility across political frontiers, reflected in a scale of financial
flows unequalled since the glory days of the nineteenth century gold
standard. Id.
6. Marc Auboin, The Trade, Debt and Finance Nexus: At the Cross-Roads of Micro-
and Macroeconomics 26 (2004) (WTO Discussion Paper No. 6), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/res e/booksp-e/discussion-papers6_e.pdf.
7. RICHARD SCHAFFER, BEVERLEY EARLE & FILIBERTO AGUSTI, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESs LAW AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 4 (5th ed., 2002).
8. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980,
1489 U.N.T.S. 59 (1980).
9. Int'l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Principles of Interna-
tional Commercial Contracts, 34 I.L.M. 1067 (1995), available at http://
www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/blackletter2OO4.pdf.
10. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
11. Treaty Establishing a Common Market (Mercado Comtin del Sur or
MERCOSUR), Mar. 26, 1991, U.N. Doc. No. A/46/155, 30 I.L.M 1041 (1991). This
treaty established a common market between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uru-
guay, and later Venezuela. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru currently
have associate member status.
12. STEPHAN RAMMELOO, CORPORATIONS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2001).
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market. In order to become more competitive and maximize profit, com-
panies have become increasingly multinational, with international corpo-
rate structures and assets located in other countries, either to achieve new
markets for their products or to reduce production costs. These modifica-
tions have caused the delocalization of business transactions around the
globe.
Similarly, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early
1970s, a new financial market arose, led by the emergence of new interna-
tional financial markets outside of the United States and Europe. 13 Since
then, financial institutions-mainly large institutional investors such as
mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies 14-have looked at
different and more profitable markets at an international level,15 mostly
motivated by the issuer's need to raise capital at lower interest levels and
facilitated by interest rate differentials as well as by the development of
new aggressive financial instruments, particularly investments created by
hedge funds.16
Nevertheless, these changes are not free of consequences. While the
last three decades have significantly improved countries' economies
through free and open trade, these changes have caused several episodes
of international financial crisis in developing nations, adversely affecting
various countries, either directly or indirectly, culminating in long-term
financial instability. Most of the economic crises were driven mainly by
the fragility of the financial sector, high inflation rates, poor banking su-
pervision, and excessive public debt. 17
In addition to the above, international free trade has also produced a
more competitive environment, particularly in local markets in develop-
ing nations. For some time now, companies from developing countries
have faced competition from foreign multinational enterprises that are
It is beyond dispute now that corporations have replaced states as the
most important makers of waves in the world's economy. It is also firmly
established that with the increasing globalisation [sic] of that economy
corporations operate in many cases far beyond the borders of the coun-
try that presided over their birth. Id.
13. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Mario Gi-
ovanoli ed., 2000).
14. JOSEPH J. NORTON, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
LAW 1999 (2001).
15. HAL S. SCOT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULA-
TION 1-2 (13th ed., 2006).
Generally, international finance transactions involve some cross-border
activity with respect to a payment, credit or investment, or financial con-
tract. The cross-border aspect of finance can arise from the fact that the
activity of the provider and the user of funds may be located in two dif-
ferent countries. A lender can market and transfer funds to a borrower in
another country, or the borrower can seek and attain funds from the
lender in the lender's country. Id.
16. MARC I. STEINBERG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW: A CONTEMPORARY AND
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999).
17. Auboin, supra note 6.
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establishing new plants and seeking to expand their market overseas with
better technologies and products than ever before.
Especially in Latin American countries, the new economic scenario has
agitated national business and forced it to redefine company structure.
Mergers and acquisitions between local business and multinationals have
been used to integrate operations in order to enable companies to grow
in local and international markets.1 8 But this has often led to reorganiza-
tions and bankruptcies with international dimensions, interconnecting va-
rious jurisdictions. This effect gave rise to issues such as conflict of laws
and has created barriers to the flow of investments between nations. The
cross-border issues and the problems faced by companies will be the fo-
cus of the next section.
B. CHALLENGES POSED BY CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY
The consequences of bankruptcy and reorganization cases have
changed dramatically in recent decades because they are no longer re-
stricted to the domestic arena. The rise of international commerce has
also impacted insolvency laws. As a result of the expansion of interna-
tional trade, insolvency and the restructuring of multinational corpora-
tions often has an international element that directly affects debtor and
creditor rights located in various jurisdictions.
In this new international arena, many companies have commercial rela-
tions outside their own territories, owning assets and assuming obliga-
tions in different countries. As a result, an enterprise that has
international commercial relations may face insolvency proceedings or
the need to restructure its debt in a foreign country under different legis-
lation, suffering its consequences either passively or actively. 19 Basically,
this result has been caused by three different factors: (i) each country has
its own legal framework to deal with international insolvency; (ii) there is
no legal mechanism that can be recognized and enforced in all jurisdic-
tions in which the company maintains business relations; and (iii) the in-
solvency regimes and procedures are quite different around the world
20
Along the same line of thinking, Fletcher states that a range of reasons
can cause cross- border insolvency procedures. 21 He argues that trade
agents may have had several contracts or interests connected with more
than one country and that each state will exercise its own jurisdiction,
18. TOMAS M. ARAYA & JACQUELINE DONALDSON, LATEST EVENTS ON CROSS-BOR-
DER INSOLVENCY IN LATIN AMERICA (2006), available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/
international/crossborder/030106.Araya.pdf.
19. THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES AND DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS (James
R. Silkenat & Charles D. Schmerler eds., 2006) [hereinafter .LAw OF INTERNA-
TIONAL INSOLVENCIES].
20. M. Natasha Labovitz & Jessica I. Basil, Corporate Restructuring and Bankruptcy:
How Will New Chapter 15 Affect Multinational Restructurings?, N.Y.L.J., July 11,
2005, available at http://media.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubs/7-11-
05_NYLJLabovitz-MulitnationalRestructurings.pdf.
21. IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES (1999).
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giving rise to the possibility of simultaneous proceedings. 22
The problem has always been that each country's private international
legal rules have not been successful in dealing with the intricacies of
transnational insolvencies and the economic logic of investors because
they are only based on rules to manage national insolvencies. Flynn ar-
gues that national insolvency laws are not capable of providing efficient
solutions in cross border proceedings.23 Hence, conflicts between na-
tional laws normally result in a dissipation of assets and a loss of opportu-
nity to rescue a viable business.
Although, in recent years, the principles of "universality" and "territo-
riality" adopted by most countries have moved towards a more sophisti-
cated approach through cooperation between countries by means of
principles such as a "modified universalism ' '24 (applied by U. S. courts)
and "cooperative territorialism," 25 these approaches have not been able
to efficiently address these issues. The problem is particularly pro-
nounced on issues such as the recognition of foreign insolvency proceed-
ings, cooperation, and access of foreign representatives to local courts.
Under the universality principle, all debtor assets may be used to settle
obligations. The ineffectiveness of this principle resides in the fact that all
countries involved should cooperate efficiently and apply the same proce-
dures in perfect harmony, giving all parties the same rights. Universalism
can only be applied efficiently if other countries recognize this principle
through full cooperation. But the harmonization of laws has been diffi-
cult to achieve, as every country is reluctant to give up its autonomy to
regulate its own insolvency proceedings.26
By contrast, the concept of the principle of territoriality is based on the
idea that the proceedings will only consider the assets located in the juris-
diction where the bankruptcy was filed. In other words, this approach is
considered to be a distinct proceeding from those initiated in other juris-
dictions. Therefore, only local assets will be used to satisfy creditors'
rights. This principle has suffered severe criticism, as it is limited to assets
located in the country where the insolvency proceeding has been filed.
Basically, it has three main disadvantages: (i) it may cause multiple and
separate proceedings in every jurisdiction where the company owns as-
sets; (ii) it creates difficulties in the reorganization proceedings of those
22. Id.
23. CROss-BORDER INSOLVENCY: A COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW
(Look Chan Ho ed., 2006) [hereinafter UNCITRAL COMMENTARY].
24. PAUL J. OMAR, EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY LAW 27-28 (2004) (stating, "Westbrook
offers the view that this principle arose from the practice in the United States of
providing for ancillary proceedings whose principal purpose is aid and assistance
to another court deemed to be the primary jurisdiction over the (usually corpo-
rate) debtor").
25. Lawrence explains that territorialism has changed, becoming more sophisticated,
"moving toward cooperative territorialism, which seeks to ameliorate some of the
most wasteful features of the grab rule by a measure of judicial cooperation." Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM. BANKR. L. J. 713, 716 (2005).
26. OMAR, supra note 24.
2008] INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INSOLVENCY LAW 319
companies that own assets overseas; and (iii) it may cause an inequitable
and discriminatory treatment of creditors based on their locations, vis-A-
vis the availability of assets in the jurisdiction. 27
In the absence of uniformity among jurisdictions, countries have ap-
plied a third way to minimize these issues. Some countries have entered
into bilateral insolvency agreements. But only a few treaties are in place
today and this has resulted in more diverse legislation and practice con-
cerning cross-border insolvencies, causing further uncertainty. 28
In the light of the fact that there is no uniform legal system and only
certain countries have appropriate legislative rules to deal with complex
cross-border issues, the lack of uniformity is still an open issue, with
courts applying a variety of doctrines, creating uncertainty. For example,
a "doctrine of comity" has been applied between common law jurisdic-
tions and an exequatur procedure has been applied in civil law jurisdic-
tions to recognize foreign judgments and enable foreign parties to
enforce property and contract rights. 29 Nevertheless, these techniques
have not been effective enough due to the fact that in the case of the
exequatur procedure, for example, reciprocal recognition of judgments
does not recognize decisions of insolvency and thus courts are restricted
to protective measures and enforcing judgments for specific sums of
money.30
In this sense, issues related to fair treatment of creditors, recognition
and enforcement of foreign proceedings, and coordination and coopera-
tion between courts have been constant concerns. Although most coun-
tries recognize foreign rights to recover debt, uncertainty about the rank
of creditors and unfamiliar procedures remain a severe problem to over-
seas creditors. Moreover, the inexistence of corporate rescue in some ju-
risdictions and the multiplicity of different procedures among countries
have caused company asset losses and frustrated restructuring
proceedings.31
These discrepancies cause four main legal and economic effects on the
flow of international trade. First, they have created obstacles to the suc-
cessful restructuring of viable global companies or, in the case of bank-
ruptcy, they have caused delays, fraudulent dissipation of assets, and
barriers to debt recovery. Second, the lack of efficient corporate rescue
27. FLETCHER, supra note 21.
28. Sandile Khumalo, International Response to the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency (July 2004) (unpublished L.L.M. research paper, Vrije
Universiteit), available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/organizations/uncitral/
InsolResponse.pdf.
29. N.Z. LAW COMM'N, REPORT No. 52, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: SHOULD NEW
ZEALAND ADOPT THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOL-
VENCY? (1999) [hereinafter NEW ZEALAND LAW REPORT].
30. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 1, at 27.
31. OMAR, supra note 24.
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laws in some countries has produced a basis for "forum-shopping" 32 be-
cause multinational enterprises that have faced temporary financial crises
have submitted themselves to jurisdictions that provide a sophisticated
legal framework for the restructuring process. Third, the inexistence of a
response to default conditions overseas along with a lack of predictability
may act as a disincentive to foreign investment, as well as to the flow of
capital to nations that do not contain well-established rules under the new
global financial impetus of corporate rescue. Lastly, the diversity of
cross-border debtors may give rise to multiple insolvency proceedings in
different countries and therefore enhance transaction costs. Hence, this
situation creates a high level of uncertainty and unpredictability in com-
mercial relations, causing serious obstacles to international investment.
C. THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF INSOLVENCY LAW
From an economic point of view, competition promotes equilibrium by
eliminating economically inefficient companies from the market. Ac-
cording to White, this elimination occurs through the legal mechanism of
bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings, based on the theory that the re-
sources used by inefficient enterprises should be better invested in other
activities to avoid losses of resources and to develop the economy.33
Under the actual economic scenario based on credit availability and
where the creation of business is essential for the economy, optimal insol-
vency systems are a vital element for achieving economic growth and fi-
nancial stability. Because any extension of credit involves risk,34 the aim
of insolvency law35 is to promote confidence in domestic and foreign
creditors in order to attract investment. 36 The UNCITRAL Legislative
Guide on Insolvency Law emphasizes this goal, stating that one of the
main objectives of insolvency law is "to establish provision of certainty to
promote economic stability and growth ... and avoid the pitfalls of inte-
gration of national financial systems with the international financial
system."'37
The global economic system is based on a principal-agent relationship
between entrepreneurs 38 (who need investment funds) and investors
(who provide the investment funds). Such a correlation produces eco-
32. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 681 (8th ed., 2004) (defining "forum-shopping" as
"[t]he practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or court in which a claim
might be heard").
33. Michelle J. White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 129(1989); INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF CRITICAL WRITINGS IN ECONOMICS 81
(Richard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi eds., 1989).
34. John Armour, The Law and Economics of Corporate Insolvency: A Review (ESRC
Ctr. for Bus. Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 197, 2001).
35. Id.
36. WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY AND
CREDITOR RIGHTS SYSTEMS (Apr. 2001) [hereinafter WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES].
37. UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10
(2005) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Legislative Guide].
38. Elazar Berkovitch & Ronen Israel, Optimal Bankruptcy Laws Across Different
Economic Systems, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 347, 348 (1999).
20081 INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INSOLVENCY LAW 321
nomic inefficiencies (first, inefficient liquidation may limit credit recover-
ability and second, continued operation of company with irreversible
outstanding instead of rapid liquidation causes further losses). Due to
these facts, insolvency law has an important role to play as a mechanism
for reducing transaction costs, by providing creditor's remedies and
debtor's rights in the cases of business failure.
39
In order to address this issue efficiently, Berkovitch states that insol-
vency law has to serve two economic objectives. The first is to reduce the
cost of financing by generating manager's incentives for liquidation in
cases of financial failure, so that further capital losses can be avoided
whenever liquidation is the most favorable option.40 This objective is the
economic reason why insolvency law always includes a creditor's chapter
that enables creditors to liquidate the company if the managers do not
liquidate by themselves, allowing the creditors to recover the investment
from the firm.4 1 Armour states that such credit powers grant debtors ex
ante incentive to repay the debt as well as help avoid shareholder expro-
priation. 42 The second objective of insolvency law is to provide rules to
avoid detrimental liquidation by creditors, in economic circumstances
where maintaining the business activity results in asset protection and
higher valuation of the company. 43 Maximizing asset value and rehabili-
tation are crucial elements of law as a means to protect a business and its
assets against individual creditor actions, permitting the efficient rescue
of distressed companies. The debtor's remedies in this case are also im-
portant in preventing inefficient liquidation whenever continuation is
more valuable for both parties, minimizing the inefficiency of the financ-
ing stage. 44
By providing these rules, insolvency law generates two economic bene-
fits. First, by offering liquidation efficiency and granting the possibility of
reaching the entrepreneur's assets, it helps reduce transaction costs.
4 5
This efficiency 46 results in cheaper money with lower interest rates for
project financing because the investors have tools to protect and recover
their interests. 47 The second benefit derives from the fact that efficient
insolvency law (liquidation and restructuring rules) generates market and
creditor confidence. 4 8 Therefore, because of the reduction investment
39. Id. at 349.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Armour, supra note 34.
43. Berkovitch & Israel, supra note 38.
44. Id.
45. Ronald H. Coase, The Relevance of Transaction Costs in the Economic Analysis of
Law, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FA-
THERS 199, 199 (Francisco Parisi & Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005) (stating that
transaction costs play a crucial role in determining how rights will be used).
46. WULF ALEXANDER KAAL, HEDGE FUND REGULATION BY BANKING SUPERVI-
SION: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2006).
47. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 418 (6th ed., 2003).
48. Berkovitch & Israel, supra note 38.
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risk, it helps to reduce the cost of money, 49 promoting incentives for the
expansion of credit.50
Apart from this, efficient rules on bankruptcy are also important to the
market economy as a means of administering and avoiding a conflict of
interest between creditors, management, and stakeholders. Bliss states
that such conflicts can easily result in a depreciation and dismemberment
of company assets because creditors would only seek a satisfaction of
their own interests, rather than collective concerns. 51 Therefore, it seems
clear that efficient coordination of different interests leads to financial
and market stability because in the absence of these rules, commercial
relations would be a risky activity,52 affecting the flow of investment
among trade agents and nations.
D. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INSOLVENCY LAW
Due to the fact that nowadays, transactions are connected with more
than one jurisdiction and that the phenomenon of globalization has in-
creased cross-border insolvencies, the international features of commer-
cial relations have submitted trade agents to different law systems.53
When a transaction is national, it is relative easy to deal with. When a
transaction or dispute has a connection with more than one jurisdiction,
however, the solution is usually decided in different jurisdictions, with
each court applying different conflicts of law rules. 54 Particularly in cases
of asset securitization and investment, Scott explains that complex issues
may arise in cross-border transactions, 55 related to what should be the
governing law for a specific deal56 because it can be very difficult to de-
fine which jurisdiction's law applies in cases where contractual relations
involve receivables and assets located in many jurisdictions.
Consequently, the possibility of applying different legal systems to the
same situation has brought concerns about certainty in international
transactions that have connections with more than one jurisdiction. 57
This uncertainty is further complicated by the divergences between com-
mon law and civil law systems. Often, these systems differ significantly
49. 1 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE LAW: THE COL-
LEcTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD A. POSNER (Francesco Parisi ed., 2000) (arguing that
"rules reduce the cost of organizing and communicating information for use in
resolving legal disputes").
50. Armour, supra note 34.
51. Robert R. Bliss, Multiple Regulators and Insolvency Regimes: Obstacles to Efficient
Supervision and Resolution, in THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 142
(David G. Mayes & Geoffrey E. Wood eds., 2007).
52. Id.
53. RAVI C. TENNEKOON, THE LAW & REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
(1991).
54. DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE, & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS (2007).
55. SCoTr, supra note 3.
56. Id. at 524.
57. TENNEKOON, supra note 53.
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on matters of the concept of law,58 the concept of the role of court, as
well as the mode of creating and enforcing contract and property rights.59
As enterprises have assumed international structures and, especially in
developing countries, have been financed by foreign creditors, this uncer-
tainty has also impacted insolvency proceedings. Although in interna-
tional business transactions the choice of law can minimize uncertainty, it
is not allowed in cases of bankruptcy regimes. Given that in most coun-
tries, insolvency regulation is considered public interest law (public pol-
icy), 60 jurisdiction over the claims in insolvency matters will be
established according to the international private rules of each state.
Therefore, the parties are not allowed to choose the applicable law.
Needless to say, from the point of view of lenders and international
investors, effective and predictable rules create a better environment for
foreign direct investment as they are capable of offering elements to ana-
lyze and assess the risks to which a specific transaction may give rise.
This preliminary evaluation helps prevent disputes.6 ' In this sense, re-
garding the rules of risk allocation, the procedures and enforcement of
creditor's rights are capable of building a better economic environment,
especially for foreign creditors who need predictability to increase lend-
ing and investing confidence.
On the other hand, from a lender's perspective, predictability in law is
also crucial. In the case of business crises, for example, this predictability
can provide better information for the managers in deciding more pru-
dently which option to choose, whether a restructuring plan or the liqui-
dation of company. In other words, predictability would give them a
better understanding of the legal and economic consequences of each exit
plan for the company, allowing the managers to decide on the most ap-
propriate action plan for the firm and the creditors' interests. 62
Thus, a well-established insolvency regime plays two important eco-
nomic roles as a means of reducing uncertainty in business transactions.
The first is that it is capable of giving all parties (creditors and debtors)
subsidies to understand in advance how insolvency proceedings operate.
By doing so, the regulation helps to anticipate the consequences that they
can reasonably expect from the law. 63 And second, it allows the creditors
to estimate more precisely the risks and legal implications of the debtors'
default.64
58. Patrick Del Duca, Alan Feld, & Cristiin Valldjo, U.S. Debt Markets Meet the
Emerging Markets: Legal Challenges Faced by Cross Border Lenders, in LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES, supra note 19.
59. Id.
60. C.M.V. CLARKSON & JONATHAN HILL, JAFFEY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2nd
ed., 2005).
61. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 37.
62. WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 36.
63. Benjamin Klein, Commentary, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Anal-
ysis, 19 J. L. & ECON 309 (1976).
64. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 37.
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In the case of cross-border insolvency, the uncertainty in existence
nowadays has been generated on account of the diversity of law regimes
applied to the same debtors in cross-border cases. Moreover, national
laws have not kept pace with the development of corporate financing and
the structuring of multinational corporations required by this new eco-
nomic environment. Parallel insolvency regimes with little coordination
between them have prejudiced creditor and debtor rights, caused proce-
dural delays, resulted in a waste of assets, and acted as a barrier to rescue
viable business.6 5 Most countries that have been involved in interna-
tional business have not efficiently addressed their national legal rules in
this regard, thus remaining under obsolete conflict of laws. The situation
has worsened as insolvency laws have been enacted to solve only domes-
tic insolvencies.
In particular after the financial crises occurring in the 1990s in emerg-
ing markets, these weaknesses in terms of insolvency law have been noted
by local and foreign investors as well as international institutions such as
the World Bank and the United Nations. These problems have discour-
aged investments and increased the cost of money (transaction costs) 6 6
for these countries. These problems have been partly caused by the inex-
istence of risk allocation rules, uncertainty related to the enforcement of
contracts and property rights, and the inability to predict risks in transac-
tions. More significantly, though, these problems have been caused by
inadequate insolvency systems that could not efficiently deal with restruc-
turing and insolvency procedures as well as barriers to recognizing for-
eign insolvency proceedings and the enforcement of creditor's rights. 67
Recently, the cases of companies such as Yukos,68 which used Ameri-
can bankruptcy law as a defensive measure under chapter 11, and
Parmalat,6 9 which created issues for the company's assets and creditors
across the globe, have also revealed the inefficiency of local legal
frameworks to deal with cross-border cases.
In most Latin American 70 and Asian countries, these inefficiencies are
still prevalent. Although in past years, the insolvency law in these coun-
65. Peter Manning & Robin Henry, United Kingdom, in LAW OF INTERNATIONAL IN-
SOLVENCIES, supra note 19.
66. KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE, & JOHN EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERN-
ANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC
RISK (2006).
67. WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 36.
68. The Yukos Oil Company was incorporated in Russia. In 2004, Yukos was placed
in bankruptcy proceedings in Russia. Facing a financial crisis, Yukos sought pro-
tection under chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in a U.S. court. MANNING
& HENRY, supra note 65; see also In re Yukos Oil Co., 320 B.R. 130 (S.D. Tex.
2004).
69. Int'l Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Cross-Border Insolvency Laws Needed to Re-
assure Investors (May 24, 2006), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/icchedb/
index.html.
70. In Latin America, Colombia and Mexico have already adopted the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. UNCITRAL Status, http://www.uncitral.
orgluncitrallenluncitral texts/insolvency/l997Modelstatus.html (last visited Mar.
3, 2008).
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tries has changed towards restructuring distressed companies and out-of-
court restructuring alternatives,71 the current bankruptcy laws are still un-
able to provide efficient solutions in cross-border cases. The lack of rules
on jurisdiction, the lack of recognition of foreign judgments, and the co-
operation and assistance among courts have caused concurrent proceed-
ings in diverse courts with the potential application of various systems of
law in bankruptcy proceedings. These factors have generated a real "race
of creditors" to recover their investment in different jurisdictions.
On the other hand, multinational companies have looked for jurisdic-
tions that can provide better remedies in terms of restructuring proce-
dures such as the United States and England. As a result, higher
uncertainty and a significant rise in transaction costs have affected all the
parties involved in cross-border procedures.
These legal weaknesses and the globalization of the trade process have
put pressure on nations to enact laws in accordance with current needs.
Increasingly, countries have realized that these issues create unnecessary
legal barriers to the objectives of insolvency law and flow of investment.
The need for an international approach to local law is a reality for which
countries involved in international commerce can no longer deny. Atten-
tion has been given to the necessity of cooperation among courts to accel-
erate and maximize the liquidation and restructuring procedures as well
as to ensure that foreign procedures can be fully recognized in local
courts.
A movement towards a further universal approach of recognition and
efficient coordination of insolvency procedures is the actual goal of the
international community as a means of strengthening predictability and
removing the legal limitations that exist today.72 This goal will work to
facilitate and increase credit availability and economic growth.
Because countries differ widely in their legal systems, as well as in their
economic and social needs, harmonization has been very difficult. Coun-
tries are unwilling to unify their substantive law in this field. Neverthe-
less, there is an urgent need for solutions at a domestic law level that
would permit courts to minimize conflicts of laws on insolvency through
the adoption of similar procedures as a means of diminishing costs, avoid-
ing proceedings delays, and extending rights protection. 73
III. THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY
A. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE MODEL LAW
The model law on cross-border insolvency was adopted in May 1997 by
71. Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Corporate Debt Restructuring in Latin America: New
Developments, New Opportunities, I.C.C.L.R. 2005, 16(6), 254-62 (2005).
72. NEW ZEALAND LAW REPORT, supra note 29.
73. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 37.
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the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law74 as a re-
sponse to the recent challenges presented on global insolvencies. Obso-
lete rules have often resulted in inadequate and inharmonious
proceedings. Consequently, fraud by debtors on hidden, dissipated assets
and the impossibility of business rescue are constant issues that have
faced parties involved in international trade.75
The Model Law was designed to assist countries with guidelines that
establish an effective legal framework for their national insolvency regu-
lations.76 The main purpose is to promote a better environment for deal-
ing with the practical terms of cross-border situations77 in a manner that
reduces the barriers and delays through advanced cooperation and coor-
dination between courts.
The Model Law does not have the objective of harmonizing the sub-
stantive insolvency law of each estate or establishing new procedural laws
for adoption nations.78 In this regard, the law clearly respects the differ-
ent procedures and substantive law of each State. Instead, the Model
Law aims to provide procedural rules especially designed to facilitate the
management and development of efficiency in terms of the coordination
of international insolvencies through rules on the following: (i) assistance
and cooperation between foreign courts (nationals courts will be empow-
ered to communicate directly with foreign courts and representatives);
(ii) coordination of concurrent proceedings as a way to speed up the ad-
ministration of diverse and simultaneous proceedings in different states
so that better liquidation and restructuring procedures can reduce the
chance of asset dissipation and debtor fraud; (iii) automatic recognition
of foreign proceedings by ensuring that international decisions can be en-
forced without the requirement of reciprocity and delays originated by
the discrepancies in procedures existing between civil law and common
law traditions; and (iv) granting to the representative expressly desig-
nated by the foreign proceeding the right to direct access to the courts of
the enacting State. 79
Therefore, the application of the Model Law is limited to issues or inci-
dents of cross-border insolvencies and assistance between courts, rather
than modifying jurisdictional rules on international private law in insol-
vency matters that are already in place in the enacting State.80 In this
sense, the Model Law covers situations where insolvency proceedings
have been opened in the enacting State, and then the enacting State re-
quires cooperation 81 from foreign authorities.
74. For a history and evolution of the UNCITRAL Model Law, see FLETCHER, supra
note 21.
75. UNCITRAL COMMENTARY, supra note 23.
76. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 37.
77. FLETCHER, supra note 21.
78. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 37.
79. Id.
80. FLETCHER, supra note 21.
81. Regarding the benefits and the dangers of court-to-court communication, see Wil-
liam Trower, Court-to-Court Communication-The Benefits and the Dangers, 4
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Moreover, the Model Law may apply in situations8 2 where the insol-
vent party has assets in another State or when a representative of foreign
procedure seeks to intervene overseas to protect debtors' and creditors'
rights.83 Finally, the Model Law can apply when creditors or any other
interested persons from a foreign State seek a start to insolvency pro-
ceedings or participate in proceedings taking place in the enacting
State.84
The Model Law is established to consider two kinds of foreign proceed-
ings: (i) foreign main proceedings and (ii) foreign non-main proceed-
ings. 85 The main foreign procedure means that a proceeding takes place
in the State where the debtor has its Centre of Main Interest (COMI). 86
On the other hand, a foreign non-main proceeding under the Model Law
means a foreign proceeding other than a main proceeding-basically
where the debtor has a commercial establishment or assets.87 Under the
Model Law, both of these proceedings will fully coordinate with courts.
Nevertheless, the Model Law has faced some barriers in terms of its
wider adoption. Given that the nature of the Model Law is not binding,88
the United Nations can only recommend to countries its adoption based
on the economic and legal advantages that it can bring to domestic legis-
lation. Furthermore, the Model Law merely becomes binding when na-
tions enact their framework into the national law system.
Despite the fact that UNCITRAL recommends full adoption of the
Model Law and its interpretation according to the Model Law Guide to
Enactment,89 countries that are willing to adopt it can freely exercise
their sovereign rights in order to enact only part of it or modify the
Model Law provisions 90 with the purpose of protecting their national in-
terests and applying restrictions (denied recognition of foreign decision)
based on public policy exemptions.91 If the enacting States do not respect
the original interpretation of the law terms (defined concepts to be ap-
plied) as well as the purposes given by UNCITRAL, and they instead
adopt the main cross-border provisions of the Model Law, such action
may cause the reverse effect, resulting in more unpredictability with re-
INT'L CORP. RESCUE (2007), available at http://www.chasecambria.com/site/jour-
nal!article.php?id=245.
82. See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 37 (for scope of application).
83. UNCITRAL COMMENTARY, supra note 23.
84. Khumalo, supra note 28.
85. See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 37, at 320.
86. In 2006, the European Court of Justice ruled in the Eurofood IFSC case that the
"Centre of Main Interest" (COMI) means the place where the company conducts
the administration of its interest on a regular basis in a manner ascertainable by
third parties. Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. 1-3813.
87. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 37, at 320.
88. UNCITRAL, FAQ-UNCITRAL Texts, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/unci-
tral-texts-faq.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) (stating that "a model law is created
as a suggested pattern for law-makers in national governments to consider adopt-
ing as part of their domestic legislation").
89. UNCITRAL COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 257.
90. Id.
91. See CLARKSON & HILL, supra note 60, at 305 (concept of public policy).
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gard to cross-border insolvency cases, as well as jeopardizing the aim of
the Model Law.
B. THE BENEFITS AND THE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES OF THE
MODEL LAW
As we have seen, particularly insofar as insolvency matters are con-
cerned, the economic rationale of international investment and credit
availability requires efficient mechanisms to enforce creditor's rights.
Furthermore, it demands predictability in allowing the parties to foresee
as far as possible the legal consequences of entering into business transac-
tions. Finally, certainty in terms of the law permits parties to measure the
impact of eventual business failure.
A domestic legal framework that covers these elements is capable of
generating investor confidence, reducing transactions costs and, conse-
quently, incentivizing new investments. By granting an efficient legal
framework to allocate risks among parties, recovery of investment for
foreign creditors and asset value, the law promotes market confidence
and incentivizes the flow of foreign investments into the local economy.
The UNCITRAL Model Law has clearly adopted these economic
objectives. Based on mechanisms of the automatic recognition of foreign
rights and foreign insolvency decisions, assistance, cooperation, and coor-
dination between courts, the law aims to promote greater certainty and
fairness for international trade and investment. 92
The Model Law also has the objective of reducing time and costs to
access foreign proceedings through the fair and efficient administration of
cross-border insolvency. In order to facilitate the illustration of the eco-
nomic advantages that it can bring, in theory, to the enacting State, two
main groups emerge, one related to the rules of automatic recognition,
enforcement, and access of foreign representative to foreign courts and
the other related to the rules of cooperation, coordination, and assistance
mechanisms in cross-border cases.
The barriers to effective and widespread cooperation and assistance be-
tween judges worldwide are derived from a lack of a legislative frame-
work in this regard. 93 The Model Law can fill this gap in order to provide
a universal framework. In doing so, it can reduce uncertainty related to
it. Thus, the Model Law generates three main economic benefits. First,
the time necessary for exchanging information between countries de-
creases rapidly. Second, it increases the credit recovery efficiency. Third,
full cooperation and assistance helps to protect company assets from dis-
sipation and may achieve successful reorganization by granting tempo-
rary remedies in the interests of all jurisdictions involved.
On the other hand, the rules of automatic recognition of foreign pro-
ceedings and access to foreign representatives enables parties to surpass
92. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 1, pmbl. (b).
93. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 37.
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the legal barriers that exist in terms of dissimilarities in the legal systems
(common law and civil law) and the different approaches of each State's
international private law system. In doing so, the enactment of Model
Law can easily speed up the procedure of recognition, thereby facilitating
its enforcement.
As an economic consequence, these mechanisms can significantly re-
duce the cost of transactions by producing the following: (i) better credit
recovery efficiency and fairness to creditors; (ii) a significant decrease in
the time needed for recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions;
and (iii) efficiency of liquidation and restructuring plans with interna-
tional features and thus maximization of asset value.
Aware of these legal and economic benefits that the UNCITRAL
Model Law can bring in matters of international commerce and the ad-
ministration of international insolvencies, the United States has enacted
the Model Law. In the case of the United States, it has adopted it in the
form of the new chapter 15, and this adoption became effective in 2005 as
part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act.
9 4
IV. THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY CODE AND
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY
A. FORUM SHOPPING, ANCILLARY PROCEEDINGS AND LATIN
AMERICAN COMPANIES
The U.S. approach to multinational corporation restructuring has al-
ways been flexible and successful. Structured under modern reorganiza-
tion legislation and court decisions funded on the rule of stare decisis,95
the United States has been very attractive for distressed companies look-
ing for protective measures.
Historically, U.S. courts have adopted a pragmatic view and extensive
jurisdiction to solve the cross-border insolvency challenges. Based on the
principle of universalism and bilateral agreements (protocols) among
common law countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom, 96 U.S.
law has developed a more efficient and predictable environment to deal
with cross-border cases when compared to civil law countries systems.
The protocols have offered rules about the rights and limitations of each
State and parties involved. Moreover, it has improved the management
of cultural differences between them, creating a better working relation-
94. Richard G. Mason, United States, in UNCITRAL COMMENTARY, supra note 23.
95. Posner and Ehrlich state that the courts in the United States do not follow the rule
strictly because it would be economically inefficient. It is the reasoning behind the
precedent based on the rule of stare decisis. See POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE,
supra note 49.
96. One of the Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol in international restructuring proce-
dures between the United States and the United Kingdom was the Federal Mogul
Corp. case. See Peter Saville & Mike Wellard, Achieving Success in Transatlantic
Restructuring, 1 INT'L CORP. RESCUE (2004), available at http://www.chasecambria.
com/site/journal/article.php?id=106.
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ship.97 This improvement happened successfully in the Maxwell bank-
ruptcy, which is considered one of the most famous international
insolvency cases. 98 In that opportunity, both courts of the United States
and the United Kingdom settled the famous Maxwell Protocol, which
provided clear and fair rules to manage the case relating to all parties
located both in the United States and the United Kingdom. 99
As the success of restructuring procedures depend on which legislation
will regulate the proceeding, non-U.S. multinational companies have
been using U.S. regulations to achieve their restructuring purposes. 100
Companies that maintain business relations or their creditors in the
United States have used the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in two different ways:
(i) multinational corporations have sought protective measures and relief
under chapter 11 by filling petitions directly in U.S. courts to have protec-
tive measures against creditors located in the United States and foreign
jurisdictions as well; and (ii) foreign companies have initiated restructur-
ing proceedings in their own jurisdictions. Companies that sought recog-
nition of a pending foreign proceeding in U.S. courts under former
section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code used it to relieve themselves from
creditors' executions and to permit themselves to perform a restructuring
process in their own jurisdiction.101
It has been especially true in the case of Latin America, where compa-
nies have accessed the U.S. market and have been heavily financed by the
United States and other foreign creditors in the form of commercial con-
tracts (such as leasing contracts), U.S. bonds (Yankee bonds) or notes
governed by U.S. laws as a means of becoming more competitive or more
liquid in the global market.10 2 Consequently, Latin American companies
have frequently sought debt restructuring plans or recognition of ancil-
lary proceedings in the United States because, normally, the main credi-
tors are located in the United States or have business connected with a
U.S. jurisdiction.
Three international restructuring cases with the following companies
based in Latin America countries illustrate this situation: (i) the Argen-
tine Television Company, Multicanal S.A. in 2002; (ii) the largest Brazil-
ian airline Varig S.A. (Viaq~o A6rea Rio Grandense); and (iii) the
Colombian Airline Avianca S.A. (Aerovias Nacionales de Col6mbia) in
97. Id.
98. John A.E. Pottow, The Maxwell Case, in BANKRUPTCY LAW STORIES 222 (Robert
Rasmussen ed., 2007).
99. Id.
100. Anthony J. Smits & Ilia M. O'Hearn, Multiple Insolvency Forum Shopping, in LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES, supra note 19, at 496-500.
101. Howard Seife, As Latin American Cross-Border Insolvencies Increase, So Do The
Questions of Law, in THE AM. RESTRUCFURING & INSOLVENCY GUIDE (2004-05),
available at http://www.chadbourne.com (select "Publications", then "Articles",
and scroll down to find title).
102. Bruce R. Zirinsky, In re Board of Directors of Multicanal S.A.-US Bankruptcy
Court Affirms Availability of Section 304 Relief to Foreign Bond Issuers, PREFER-
ENTIAL TREATMENT, Fall 2004, available at http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/
newsletter/FRDFaII04.pdf.
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2003.103 In all of these cases, at the time of their financial crises, the com-
panies had foreign creditors located in the United States and the con-
tracts were also governed by U.S. law.
In the Multicanal case, 10 4 the company had issued several debt con-
tracts governed by New York law (the U.S. Trust Indenture Act) and
sought for recognition of the ancillary proceeding under section 304 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. As the amount in these contracts represented
ninety-seven percent of the company's debt, Multicanal sought a decision
in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York to
bind all the creditors under the Argentine bankruptcy law to conduct the
restructuring process in Argentina. The court recognized that the restruc-
turing proceeding in Argentina (Acuerdo Preventivo Extrajudicial) 10 5
was a form of insolvency proceeding (similar to pre-package) under sec-
tion 304 and hence, gave full effect to stop U.S. creditors' actions. 10 6
The Brazilian Varig case also sought for recognition of the Brazilian
reorganization plan under the ancillary procedure in the United States
with the purpose of binding all creditors (the lessor of its aircrafts and its
engines) under the restructuring procedure ongoing in Brazil at the time.
The New York court granted Varig's motion on the ancillary proceedings
for a permanent injunction in the terms decided by the general assembly
of Varig's creditors, giving full effect in the United States and elsewhere
with U.S. court jurisdiction regarding all the parties.10 7 It permitted the
airline to perform a better reorganization plan in Brazil without fear of
loosing its main aircrafts and suddenly stopping the companies' activities.
The company's asset value in this case was protected.
Lastly, in the Avianca case, although the company had its principal
place of business and the majority of its creditors in Colombia, the airline
filed a restructuring proceeding under chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, instead of using the Colombian bankruptcy laws. The company
based its proceeding on the argument that the Colombian bankruptcy law
at the time could not grant effective restructuring proceedings. Because
the company had sufficient contact 0 8 with the U.S. jurisdiction, such as
bonds subject to U.S. law and leasing contracts of their aircrafts with
103. For more about Avianca, see ARAYA & DONALDSON, supra note 18.
104. Zirinsky, supra note 102.
105. Rodigo Olivares-Caminal, Expedited Debt Restructuring Under Argentine Law:
Acuerdo Preventivo Extrajudicial (APE), in EXPEDITED DEBT RESTRUCTURING:
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 19-53 (Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal
ed., 2007).
106. ARAYA & DONALDSON, supra note 18.
107. Otto Eduardo Fonseca & Paulo Penalva Santos, Varig Recovery-Latest Develop-
ments: US Decision and Bankruptcy Court Has Sole Jurisdiction for All Recovery
Plan Issues, INT'L CASE LAW ALERT (EIR Conferences, Ltd., London), Aug, 21,
2007, at 8, available at http://www.eir-database.com/insolvency-caselaw-alert.php
(follow "Insolvency Caselaw Alert").
108. Avianca had a fleet of thirty-one aircraft and more than dozen spare engines that it
leased from lessors located or doing business in the United States. See Seife, supra
note 101.
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creditors located there, the U.S. court exercised jurisdiction. 10 9
These cases have proved that the U.S. courts have been willing to exer-
cise jurisdiction in cross-border cases over companies which have suffi-
cient contact with the United States and have shown that a foreign
reorganization proceeding can be recognized under U.S. law with the aim
of permitting the rescue of financially distressed companies located over-
seas. Additionally, these cases have opened a way for Latin American
companies that have U.S. creditors to seek restructuring and recognition
of reorganization proceedings in U.S. courts. Certainly, this option will
increase the number of foreign companies in U.S. courts seeking protec-
tive measures, both under ancillary and chapter 11 proceedings. Never-
theless, it is incontestable that this plurality of proceedings generates
uncertainty to creditors, enhances the cost to parties, and can result in
asset dissipation of companies located overseas.
In response to the importance of centralized and coordinated proceed-
ings, the United States' t° has adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency to improve its procedural domestic regulation
under the new chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code (Ancillary and Other
Cross-Border Cases), changing this situation in some respects.
B. CHAPTER 15
The new chapter 15 has replaced section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, which previously governed the recognition and administration of
foreign proceedings in U.S. courts.111 Basically, the purpose of the for-
mer ancillary proceeding was to allow a foreign representative to open
limited proceedings to cover assets located in the United States. Chapter
15 aims to harmonize these domestic and foreign proceedings for mul-
tinational corporations and encourage cooperation with foreign courts in
a more efficient way than did section 304 among the United States courts,
trustees, debtors, and overseas judicial authorities. 112
Essentially, section 1501(b) of chapter 15113 covers four main situa-
tions: (i) where a foreign court or foreign representative seeks the assis-
tance of the U.S. courts in connection with foreign proceedings; (ii)
where a U.S. court seeks the assistance of a foreign court in cases under
chapter 11; (iii) where a foreign proceeding and a case under chapter 11
are concurrent; and (iv) where creditors and other interested persons in a
109. Araya & Donaldson, supra note 18.
110. The United Kingdom also enacted the UNCITRAL Model Law in 2006. For in-
formation about the scope and application of cross-border insolvency in UK and
EU cross-border cases, see FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW: SUPPLEMENT TO SECOND EDITION (2007).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (2007).
112. New Chapter 15 of Bankruptcy Code Provides More Options for Non-US Debtors,
CLIENT ALERT (Latham & Watkins), Apr. 29, 2005, available at http:H
www.lw.com/Resources.aspx?page=ClientAlertDetail&publication=1259 [herein-
after New Chapter 15].
113. For recent chapter 15 cases, see Chapterl5.com: Ancillary and Other Cross-Border
Cases, http://www.chapterl5.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
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foreign country have an interest in requesting the commencement of, or
participation in, a case or proceeding under chapter 11 in the United
States.
Similarly, chapter 15 of the Model Law is structured on foreign main
proceedings and foreign non-main proceedings. Basically, a proceeding
under chapter 15 starts with a "petition for recognition" by a foreign rep-
resentative that must be accompanied by a procedure proof of foreign
insolvency proceedings, usually a certificate from an overseas court or
other acceptable evidence.' 1 4
Afterwards, the U.S. court will decide whether the court can recognize
the proceeding or not. According to section 1506, the U.S. courts are
empowered by law to refuse foreign proceedings if they are against U.S.
policy.115 Moreover, at this stage, the court will determine whether the
foreign proceeding will be considered as a foreign main or non-main pro-
ceeding under the regulation. The proceeding will be recognized as a
main proceeding if the debtor has its COM1116 in a foreign country.117
But, if the debtor only has assets overseas or an establishment, it will be
classified as a non-main proceeding.
The protective measures to creditors and debtors are available in both
foreign main and non- main proceedings, and this is regulated by section
1521. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code grants different remedies to avoid the
fraudulent transfer of assets to other jurisdictions as well as to stop any
execution against the debtors. These tools serve to guarantee a fair re-
structuring process and to protect investment recovery. Indeed, chapter
15 has increased the efficiency of such measures by granting automatic
protective measures as a direct effect of recognition as compared to the
former rules. 118
The amendments introduced by chapter 15 have not changed the juris-
diction rules at all. The overall U.S. perspective on the conflict of law on
bankruptcy matters continues to be the same. Nevertheless, from now on
U.S. courts shall have full respect and cooperation to the "maximum ex-
tent possible"11 9 with the foreign main proceeding taking place overseas,
thereby giving maximum protection to assets located in United States.
Even with the changes brought by chapter 15, U.S. courts continue to
face obstacles in dealing with the restructuring of multinational corpora-
114. 11 U.S.C. § 1511(b) (2007).
115. Id. § 1506.
116. Although there is no definition of "Centre of Main Interest" (COMI), the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in the Eurofood IFSC case recently held that, for the pur-
poses of EC insolvency regulation, the COMI must be identified and ascertainable
by third parties in order to ensure legal certainty and foreseeability regarding the
determination of court jurisdiction to open an insolvency proceeding. See UNCI-
TRAL COMMENTARY, supra note 23.
117. UNCITRAL provides guidance to enacting States for interpreting the meaning of
COMI. See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 37.
118. See Elizabeth S. Strong, United States, in LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES,
supra note 19.
119. This is one of the main goals of chapter 15.
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tions that maintain assets spread out over different jurisdictions. This
problem is caused by the difficulty of enforcing U.S. restructuring or in-
solvency decisions on countries that do not recognize the United States as
an appropriate forum.1 20 Therefore, the enactment of the Model Law by
other jurisdictions would be a more efficient way, from the perspective of
the United States and other countries, to manage and protect the parties'
interests in international insolvencies. The legal efficiencies and eco-
nomic consequences of the adoption of the Model Law and its result for
the United States will be analyzed in the following section.
C. THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF CHAPTER 15
Historically, the common law system has been economically character-
ized as a legal system, which has promoted economic growth by allowing
permissive entrepreneurial activity. For this reason, common law has
brought efficiency to society as a whole. The strong influence of effi-
ciency logic on court decisions has permitted proficient allocation of re-
sources among trade agents. It has accelerated the maximization of
wealth by allowing capital investment to be more profitable to
investors.12 1
Under the economic analysis of common law, procedural rules such as
chapter 15 are considered as a mechanism specially designed to reduce
transaction costs (in this case the cost of bankruptcy proceedings), 122 in
that they increase predictability of the legal consequences of using the
judicial system to enforce creditor and debtor rights in situations of busi-
ness failure. 123 Chapter 15 clearly has the intention of promoting greater
certainty for trade and investment, reducing proceeding time as well as
extending protection to all parties through tools that aim to ensure the
following: (i) fair creditor treatment; (ii) facilitation of rescue of dis-
tressed companies; (iii) maximization of debtors' assets; and (iv) fair and
efficient administration of international insolvency.124
The enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law can result in a more
reliable procedural legal framework for ancillary cases, such as the Varig
and the Multicanal cases, 125 as the new rules are able to significantly re-
duce the time required to recognize and enforce foreign decisions and
extend protective remedies to make reorganization proceeding success-
ful. For example, a foreign representative can now obtain more immedi-
ate temporary measures because under section 304 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, this sort of remedy could only be granted if the inter-
120. Labovitz & Basil, supra note 20.
121. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 47.
122. For a discussion of the excessive costs generated by reorganization proceedings
under chapter 11, see Stephen J. Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, 1
INT'L CORP. RESCUE (2006), available at http://www.chasecambria.com/site/jour-
nallarticle.php?id=227.
123. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 47.
124. § 1501.
125. For more about Multicanal, see Olivares-Caminal, supra note 105, at 42-43.
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ested party did not controvert the petition in time. 126 Under chapter 15,
however, these measures are granted only upon application of recogni-
tion and the request of the interested party.
12 7
Apart from this, chapter 15 would also offer automatic recognition of
foreign proceedings and full coordination and assistance 128 avoiding the
plurality of proceedings among courts. Consequently, the application of
chapter 15 at the time of the Multicanal and Varig cases could theoreti-
cally have reduced their costs and the uncertainty created by the possibil-
ity of conflicting decisions. 12
9
In this way, based on the assumption that the rules brought by chapter
15 can enhance predictability by allowing parties to anticipate the effects
that they can expect from the law, chapter 15 may reduce the costs of
debt financing. Thus, it incentivizes the availability of credit and the flow
of investments in two different ways. First, it can attract more foreign
investment to the United States as it permits faster recognition of foreign
decisions and better cross-border administration. Therefore, there is
more efficiency in credit recovery for overseas creditors. Second, it also
incentivizes the flow of investment from the United States to other re-
gions of the globe, such as Latin America, which has multinational com-
panies that often need to be financed by creditors located in United
States or regulated by U.S. law because this can facilitate the coordina-
tion of procedures taking place in the United States and overseas.
Hence, the economic role of chapter 15 in cross-border cases is to es-
tablish a better legal environment whereby trade agents can reasonably
foresee the risks involved in cross-border cases, identify the tools availa-
ble for credit recovery of assets situated overseas through coordination
among courts, produce certainty, and reduce the cost of money for invest-
ments overseas and in the United States. 130 Furthermore, the regulation
serves to promote a better legal mechanism to achieve successful restruc-
turing procedures of transnational corporations through the maximiza-
tion of assets value.
The efficiency of credit recovery and greater protection of investments
derived from these laws automatically lead to an expansion of credit.
126. New Chapter 15, supra note 112.
127. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1519-21 (2007).
128. See Trower, supra note 81.
129. See Olivares-Caminal, supra note 105, at 42-43.
130. Although there are economic benefits to be derived from the new international
insolvency regulation in the United States, today there is also the fear that chapter
15 may reduce U.S. creditors' recoveries from assets located in United States as
well as from U.S. subsidiaries under a foreign main proceeding. The discussion is
based upon two main facts. First, chapter 15 may increase the credit recovery of
foreign creditors at the expense of U.S. creditors. Second, chapter 15 may turn
U.S. assets over to a foreign main proceeding even when it can result in a lower
credit recovery to the whole procedure. See G. Larry Engel, Suggested Clarifica-
tions and Reforms for U.S. Chapter 15 and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency on Which it is Based: The Pragmatic Cynics' Concerns (June 12-
13, 2006), available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/usa/20060620morrison.pdf.
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Therefore, chapter 15131 creates legal incentives for investors and lenders
to enter into international transactions, helping to generate economic
growth.
V. THE BRAZILIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY
A. A BRIEF VIEW OF THE BRAZILIAN BANKRUPTCY AND
REORGANIZATION LAW
The new Brazilian Bankruptcy and Reorganization Law came into ef-
fect in 2006.132 This new regulation replaced the former Decree Law
7.661, which regulated liquidation and rehabilitation procedures. The
changes implemented were a result of the lack of an adequate legal
framework to deal effectively with restructuring procedures for distressed
companies as well as the limitation on credit recovery faced by investors.
Basically, the former law was not able to provide sustainable mecha-
nisms for distressed companies. 133 The old reorganization (concordata)
rules suffered with the inexistence of efficient protective measures for
debtors seeking restructuring plans, mainly because tax and labor credi-
tors could not be included in the restructuring plan. 134 Consequently, the
real possibilities of credit recovery by secured and unsecured investors
had limited chances of success because in most of cases, their credits were
behind the preferred ones, mainly labor and tax credits. Moreover, the
prohibition of private negotiation among parties on judicial procedures
and the lack of out-of-court restructuring plans were also considered
problems in the old law. 135 These deficiencies were causing the discour-
agement of credit to the Brazilian companies and barriers to the flow of
foreign investments into the Brazilian economy. 136
Aware of this, the new law introduces the concept of "corporate res-
cue."1 37 The law now aims to create efficient possibilities of reorganizing
economically viable firms, permitting judicial and out-of-court plans. An-
other innovation is that the restructuring plan must be approved by a
general assembly of creditors. 138 Additionally, the law has extended pro-
tective measures for debtors to avoid premature liquidation, further pro-
tecting asset value. On the other hand, in the case of liquidation, the
legislation has established a different ranking of payments, placing the
131. See Olivares-Caminal, supra note 105, at 42-43.
132. See Lei No. 11.101, de 9 de fevereiro de 2005, D.O.U. de 09.02.05 (Brazil).
133. Fabio Ulhoa Coelho, MANUAL DE DIREITO COMERCIAL (13th ed., 2002).
134. Decreto No. 7.661, de 21 de junho de 1945, D.O.U. de 31.07.1945 (Brazil).
135. Luiz Fernando Valente-de-Paiva, Brazil's Two New Mechanisms for Out-of-Court
Reorganizations: Homologation of Consensus and Enforcement of Agreement, in
EXPEDITED DEBT RESTRUCTURING: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALY-
sIs 97-128 (Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal ed., 2007).
136. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), ECONOMIC SURVEY OF BRA-
ZIL 2005: REFORMING BRAZIL'S BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION (2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/12/34427462.pdf.
137. See Lei 11.101.
138. See id. ch. 3, § 2, art. 52(V).
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secured creditors in a more favorable position to recover their invest-
ments. Under the new law, the secured creditors are just behind the la-
bor credits. 139 These modifications were implemented to promote better
confidence among investors.
In order to succeed in corporate rescue and protect all the interests
involved, apart from an out-of court possibility, the law introduces two
main judicial proceedings. The extra-judicial procedure (similar to pre-
packaged in United States) and the judicial restructuring procedure
named recuperagdo judicial (similar to the chapter 11 in the United
States) are based upon the principle of social function 140 that the com-
pany plays in modern society as an entity that has fundamental economic
and social value. On the other hand, as a response to investors, the law
now offers more power to make decisions to creditors in debt restructur-
ing and has rules designated to maximize asset value, preserve employ-
ment and promote protection of creditors' rights. Instead of a proceeding
aiming at just credit collection, the law seeks to preserve the business as a
whole when it is the most favorable option. All of it has been in place as
a manner to promote market confidence and stimulate economic activity
in Brazil. 141
The law seems to have achieved its objectives. The first successful case
under the new law was the Parmalat Brasil case, which achieved reorgani-
zation through a variety of agreements among the company and credi-
tors. 142 Among others, the company sold some of its assets and made
immediate payment at an almost eighty percent discount rather than
making an arrangement extending the repayment time. 143 Another rele-
vant case is the Brazilian, family-owned manufacturer of confectionary
products, Indtistria de Produtos Alimentfcios Cory, which also restruc-
tured its debt equivalent to $57 million (one-third of it was secured credi-
tors) through judicial reorganization (recuperag&o judicial) after
negotiating with its creditors. 144
Despite these important modifications towards better insolvency effi-
ciency, Brazil still faced serious barriers to deal with cross-border insol-
vencies because the new law did not consider the current issues on
international insolvency at all. These deficiencies will be analyzed in the
next section.
139. See id. ch. 5, § 2, art. 83(11).
140. See id. ch. 3, § 1, art. 47.
141. See id.
142. Rod Smith. Minister Okays Parmalat Plan for Reorganization, FEEDSTUFFS, July
26, 2004.
143. Janis Sarra, Brazil Modernizes Its Insolvency Law (INSOL Int'l, London, UK),
Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://www.insol.org/emailer/february2007-downloads/
BrazilModernises.doc.
144. Christopher Andrew Jarvinen, The Sweet Smell of Success: Brazilian Confectioner,
Industria de Produtos Alimenticios Cory, Obtains a Fresh Start Under Brazil's New
Bankruptcy and Restructuring Law, 3 INT'L CORP. RESCUE 372, 372-73 (2006),
available at http://www.chasecambria.com/site/journal/article.php?id=70.
338 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 14
B. THE CHALLENGES FACED BY BRAZIL IN
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY
Although intense international trade is ongoing, Brazil does not pro-
vide an efficient legal framework to deal with cross-border cases. The
rules that have been in force are inadequate and outdated in solving the
current issues on insolvencies with international features. The main
problems faced by Brazil are the following: (i) the impossibility of recog-
nition of foreign proceedings and access to foreign representatives; (ii)
the lack of coordination and assistance rules among jurisdictions; (iii) the
time required for the recognition of a foreign creditor's rights in exe-
quatur procedures; and (iv) the inefficiency of foreign court or other au-
thority procedural orders (Rogatory Letters) among jurisdictions to
protect parties' rights.
As is the case in most of civil law countries, Brazil has adopted the
principle of territoriality to exercise jurisdiction. 145 Under this scheme,
the Brazilian court will have exclusive authority over companies (in-
cluded branches and subsidiaries), assets, and any business taking place in
Brazil. Thus, the proceeding will only consider the assets located in Bra-
zil and the procedure will be considered distinct from other jurisdictions.
Foreign decisions regarding the same assets and debtors will not have any
effect in Brazil. Thus, only local assets will respond to the creditors'
rights under Brazilian procedure. 146
A foreign creditor is entitled to an open insolvency proceeding in Bra-
zil. Nevertheless, this right will only be related to assets located in Brazil,
and the law requires a deposit by foreigners for court fees and the total
amount of the action (credit amount) to initiate the procedure. 147 Unlike
the United States, Brazil does not recognize ancillary proceedings and
does not grant access by foreign representatives to Brazilian courts. As a
result, in theory, liquidations and restructuring plans in Brazil are decided
exclusively by Brazilian courts, without coordination or without consult-
ing any foreign authority. Furthermore, it does not allow the participa-
tion of a foreign representative to help coordinate the issues and final
decisions of the proceeding. This situation produces multiple procedures
in different jurisdictions and can easily affect the fairness of treatment
among local and foreign creditors, also creating an obstacle to the admin-
istration of the entire insolvency.
Additionally, the approach applied by Brazil causes obstacles to suc-
cessful reorganization plans because there is no unity. This situation be-
comes further complicated because Brazil also suffers from a lack of
efficient legislation in terms of coordination and assistance issues. De-
145. See Lei 11.101, ch. 1, art. 3.
146. Thomas Benes Felsberg, Cross-Border Insolvencies and Restructuring in Brazil
(Jan. 27, 2003), available at http:llwww.iiiglobal.orglcountrylbrazil/Cross%20Bor-
der%20(012703)%202.pdf.
147. Wilson Carlos de Godoy, Direito Falimentar Internacional (Jan. 2004), available at
http://jus2.uol.com.br/doutrinaltexto.aspid=5141.
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spite the fact that the Rogatory Letter utilized by Brazil does not require
a procedure of recognition to be delivered but only a single order
(decisdo monocrdtica) from the President of the Superior Tribunal de Jus-
tiqa (STJ) 1 48 granting the execution of foreign act, 149 this mechanism has
been unable to deliver an efficient exchange of procedural orders be-
tween jurisdictions, as normally it takes too long. Besides administrative
problems, it also enhances costs and causes difficulties in granting protec-
tion in Brazil as well as in executing protective measures from other
courts as a form to guarantee foreign creditors' rights.
Although Brazil has ratified the Bustamante Code, whose purpose is to
govern automatic recognition and enforcement of bankruptcy proce-
dures, the convention is restricted to signatory states (Latin America
countries), excluding the most important Brazilian investor partners such
as the United States and European Union (EU) countries.1 50 Further-
more, the code has not addressed cooperation and assistance procedures
in cases of parallel proceedings in various jurisdictions.151 Hence, the ap-
plication of the Bustamante Code has been almost nonexistent because
the main flow of investment is from or is legally connected with other
jurisdictions, rather than investors being located in the signatory states of
the code.
Brazilian law does not present any restrictions to foreign creditors
seeking the recognition and enforcement of their rights in Brazil. Foreign
creditors are entitled to the same rights as Brazilian ones. 152 But they
need to recognize their rights before enforcing them when their credit is
based on foreign credit. As with other civil law countries, the legal way
to have a foreign credit right enforceable in Brazil is through the exe-
quatur procedure, which is a procedure at the STJ named Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Decisions.1 53
The problem has been the time needed for recognition and the com-
plexities existing in the exequatur procedure. This has been inadequate
and inefficient in serving the economic dynamic required in modern
bankruptcies because it also takes too long to become enforceable, in-
creasing the cost to enforce the credit. Felsberg argues that the complica-
tions existing in the exequatur procedure can easily discourage investors
seeking credit recovery in Brazil under the actual economic circum-
stances, as in practical terms, the investors are unwilling to wait for a long
time for a final court decision.' 54
148. Resolution No. 9, de 4 de maio de 2005, D.J. de 06.05.2005 (Brazil).
149. IRINEU STRENGER, DIREITO PROCESSUAL INTERNACIONAL (1st ed., 2003).
150. See Felsberg, supra note 146, at 5.
151. See FLETCHER, supra note 21.
152. Ord6lio Azevedo Sette & Juliano Battella Gotlib, Brazil, in Law of International
Insolvencies, supra note 19.
153. Marco Aur6lio Gumieri Val6rio, Homologaqdo e Execuqao de Sentenqa Arbitral
Estrangeira no STJ (Feb. 2006), available at http://jus2.uol.com.br/doutrina/
texto.asp?id=8098.
154. Felsberg, supra note 146, at 11.
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In the absence of efficient regulation on international insolvency, Bra-
zilian courts have been obliged to apply a range of different approaches
based on the international private rules available and have been forced to
create other mechanisms to try to surpass it. The Parmalat Brasil case has
shown this effect. Although the Brazilian court had applied the territori-
ality principle to exercise jurisdiction over all the assets located in Brazil,
the international feature presented had forced the Brazilian courts to
work very closely with foreign courts, creditors, and competent authori-
ties to coordinate the global company restructuring.1 55
Although international protocols were not made at that moment, the
interested parties in Brazil, Italy and the United States established a sort
of ad hoc coordination of litigation occurring in each country. Moreover,
the creditors' representatives and intervener appointed by the Italian
government also coordinated the actions between themselves. Because
Parmalat Brasil was the biggest plant of the company in the world and
had a strong social relevance, 156 it utilized the restructuring procedure
ongoing in Brazil as an argument to negotiate a better position with for-
eign creditors to achieve reorganization in Brazil and elsewhere.' 57
Despite the fact that the restructuring procedure was successful in ap-
plying a range of different and unique methods, the Parmalat Brasil case
emerged with serious concerns about the lack of specific regulations on
cross-border situations in Brazil.158 Issues related to the impossibility of
recognition of foreign proceedings as well as the lack of rules providing
coordination, assistance, and cooperation among courts were clearly felt
by all the parties involved.
The occurrence of simultaneous proceedings in many jurisdictions such
as Italy, Ireland, Brazil, and the United States brought about the issues of
possible conflicting decisions and concerns about the applicability of dif-
ferent rules and also how different courts would manage that situation.
Despite being under European insolvency law (the EU has adopted the
UNCITRAL Model Law), the European Court of Justice settled the
COMI in the Eurofood IFSC case (a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Parmalat Brasil S.A.), 159 giving jurisdiction of the main proceeding to
Irish courts. But this decision could not be recognized under Brazilian
law because Brazil had exclusive jurisdiction over Parmalat Brasil (terri-
toriality approach) and also because Brazil does not recognize ancillary
proceedings. Therefore, the decision could not be enforced in Brazil at
155. Debate Binacional, CONSULTOR JURMDICO, July 31, 2007, available at http://con-
jur.estadao.com.br/static/text/58089,1.
156. At the time of the Parmalat crisis, the company had eight plants in Brazil; opera-
tions in 371 cities; 3,174 direct jobs; 12,696 indirect jobs; 67,750 workers involved in
milk production, and 6,300 workers involved in vegetable production. See Thomas
Benes Felsberg, Parmalat: Tensions in International Restructurings: The Brazilian
Perspective 4 (June 7, 2005), available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/brazil/
070315Felsberg.PDF.
157. See id. at 10.
158. See Felsberg, supra note 146.
159. See FLETCHER, supra note 21.
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all, and so it was only effective in EU Member States. Hence, a high level
of uncertainty was felt on a national and international level by creditors,
governments, and employees in relation to the future of the company.
The lack of unity in the proceedings occurring in Europe and Brazil
and the litigation of U.S. creditors in New York courts160 remained a seri-
ous concern, principally related to whether the local courts in each coun-
try could protect the public and private interests affected and how the
restructuring plans would be administered in different jurisdictions, ap-
plying diverse laws and procedures.
C. THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF THE UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW
Commercial law has been recognized as a legal tool designated to regu-
late business transactions with the purpose of giving inventives for invest-
ment and credit. By doing so, commercial law aims to help economic
growth. Through the times, courts have realized that economic and social
advances cannot be stopped by the application of outdated laws. As a
response, court precedents have played an essential role in improving
business law as a way to give predictability to trader agents.
Fortunately, Brazilian courts have recognized the economic relevance
of commercial law and have started applying rules with flexibility to reach
the economic role presented in business law.161 For example, in the
Parmalat Brasil case, the Brazilian court granted the application of the
new bankruptcy law, allowing the company to file a reorganization plan
before its enactment by the government. Based upon the inefficiency of
the former law in terms of delivering restructuring measures and consid-
ering the social importance of the company in the national economic sce-
nario, the Brazilian court correctly decided to apply the draft of the new
regulation to permit the company's rescue. 162
Following the U.S. tendency, Brazil has given signals of adopting a
more pragmatic view in dealing with commercial cases. Nevertheless,
Brazil has been punished by the delays of final court decisions and the
delays in introducing modern legislation to address the global market re-
ality. This situation is the case of the bankruptcy law. Recently, Brazil
lost an important opportunity to improve its domestic legislation in inter-
national insolvency. Although significant modifications occurred on the
grounds of corporate rescue, the possibility of out-of-court procedures,
and the ranking of secured creditors, the new law did not address cross-
160. A U.S. court ruled that U.S. creditors could not pursue claims against Parmalat
Finaziaria in a New York court but rather they have to litigate in Italy. U.S. Credi-
tors Get Setback in Parmalat Case, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 31, 2005, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/30/business/parma.php.
161. DANIELA BALLAO ERNLUND, WORKING WITH PRECEDENTS To DEVELOP THE
RULE OF BRAZILIAN COMMERCIAL LAW IN A WORLDWIDE SCENARIO 7-8 (Jan. 26-
27, 2007), available at http://www.law.pitt.edu/academics/programs/cileLLME
rnlund.pdf.
162. Id.
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border insolvency situations at all. 163
The lack of legislative tools previously referred to and the intense inter-
national trade ongoing in Brazil urgently require the adoption of a mod-
ern legal framework to incentivise the flow of investment into Brazil. The
current situation causes a high level of uncertainty for foreign creditors as
shown in the Parmalat Brasil and Varig cases. The inexistence of a clear
legal framework and the application of a variety of techniques are ex-
tremely detrimental to foreign investments and the objectives of insol-
vency proceedings. 164 These issues do not permit investors and lenders to
foresee in a clear mode the legal consequences arising from cross-border
cases. Therefore, parties entering into international transactions, con-
nected with Brazilian jurisdiction are unable to access adequately the
risks involved. Such obstacles discourage investments and enhance the
cost of money for Brazil.
Although Brazilian courts have been flexible in trying to solve these
issues, the enactment of the Model Law undoubtedly would equip Brazil-
ian domestic legislation with a modern legal framework with which to
overcome the obstacles 165 in recognition of foreign procedures. The
Model Law's enactment would also help overcome the inexistence of pro-
ficient rules to coordinate concurrent proceedings as a means of protect-
ing economically viable businesses and liquidation procedures from the
negative economic consequences that are derived from the lack of profi-
cient rules.
The body of rules existent in the Model Law would radically increase
the efficiency of the administration of cross-border cases by allowing full
cooperation among courts in less time and automatic recognition of for-
eign procedures. Consequently, the Brazilian system could improve pro-
tective measures for both creditors and companies. This system would
avoid the limitations as well as the excessive time and cost involved in
exequatur procedures, and it would also replace the inefficient system of
Rogatory Letters in international insolvency cases.
For example, if the Model Law had been in force at the time of the
restructuring process of airline Varig, the company would not have
needed to file ancillary procedures in the United States to recognize the
Brazilian reorganization proceeding in order to receive protective mea-
sures against foreign creditors. The Model Law in this case would have
avoided a new procedure in United States. Under the UNCITRAL
Model Law, a simple automatic recognition of the procedure occurring in
Brazil would stop foreign creditor's action against the company's assets.
A unitary procedure, in this case, would have also reduced time and ex-
pense. The uncertainty caused by the possibility of conflicting decisions
163. Felsberg, supra note 146, at 3.
164. Jernej Sekolec, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, in IN-
TERNATIONAL BANK INSOLVENCIES: A CENTRAL BANK PERSPECTIVE 337, 337-46
(Mario Giovanoli & Gregor Heinrich, eds., 1999).
165. Felsberg, supra note 146, at 13.
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would have also been avoided. Moreover, an immediate automatic rec-
ognition and a unitary restructuring proceeding would have helped to
avoid the losses suffered by the company in the stock exchange (fall of
the share price) and thus could have protected the asset value in a better
manner during the first moments of the company's crisis. Furthermore,
such measures would have created a better legal environment, which
would have established more confidence in the market for creditors and
investors located in Brazil and elsewhere since the time the procedure
began.
The same is true for the Parmalat Brasil case. The Model Law would
have provided automatic recognition of foreign procedures and better
tools for full cooperation and assistance among courts and all parties lo-
cated in Europe and in the United States, rather than distinct procedures
in Brazil and unharmonious coordination among parties located in vari-
ous jurisdictions. Hence, the Model Law could have avoided the eco-
nomic inefficiencies brought about by concurrent procedures related to
the same debtor, further facilitating the management and restructuring of
the multinational company as whole. Moreover, the application of the
UNCITRAL Model Law establishing a unique and fully coordinated pro-
ceeding in this case would have helped restrained the widespread credi-
tors' fear of the collapse of the company in different countries, principally
in Brazil and Italy where the company had strong economic activity and
social relevance.
The uncertainty caused by the absence of appropriate rules could be
radically reduced by the enactment of the Model Law. The adoption of
this uniform set of rules, especially designed to harmonize national and
international procedures in cross-border cases, can result in a reliable in-
ternational insolvency legal system in Brazil. This system would prevent
companies incorporated in Brazil from seeking to start distinct proce-
dures overseas with the aim of protective measures, as was the case with
Varig S.A.
Similarly, enactment of the Model Law would allow foreign procedures
to be automatically recognized in Brazil, and the access of foreign repre-
sentatives would help local courts in dealing with liquidation and restruc-
turing decisions that may affect foreign proceedings. Consequently, in
theory, it would establish a better legal environment at a lower cost for
trade and investment by granting harmonious procedures, faster and fur-
ther protection, as well as fair treatment to all parties involved.
It is worth saying that in international trade, a combination of substan-
tive rules with procedural rules of cooperation among courts is crucial for
market confidence. As previously mentioned, Brazil formulated their in-
solvency law, permitting successful corporate rescue. Nevertheless, the
inexistence of procedural rules on cross-border cases remains.
The implementation of these sophisticated rules would fill this gap and
would supply Brazil with efficient and harmonious tools, attending to the
needs of cross-border insolvencies. Therefore, the enactment of the
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Model Law can confer a more favorable legal environment to attract in-
ternational investments to Brazil 166 as well as to better protect the invest-
ments already existing by increasing economic efficiency and the
predictability of trade agents in cases of multinational business failure
connected with the country.
VI. CONCLUSION
The expansion of international trade and the financial market across
the globe have posed new challenges for bankruptcy law. The lack of
adequate rules in international insolvency has often caused losses for
companies and creditors, making it evident that effective rules in cross-
border cases are a necessity that can no longer be denied.
The UNCITRAL Model Law was designed with this purpose in mind.
It possesses the essential elements to equip countries with adequate legis-
lation to overcome the barriers in domestic regulation towards full coop-
eration and assistance among courts. Without any interference in
substantive legislation, the Model Law is capable of reducing expenses
and transaction costs associated with insolvency proceedings by giving
predictability to traders through more efficient and harmonious rules.
Despite the fact that Brazil has moved towards an effective corporate
rescue approach, Brazil has not yet realized this importance. Brazil still
suffers from a lack of adequate legislation with regard to bankruptcy law
in dealing with cross-border insolvencies, and it has not addressed the
global market reality nor has it been in accordance with its position in the
international economic scenario as one of the biggest economies of the
world. The recent cases affecting Brazil have showed that international
insolvency requires the combination of efficient local rules in insolvency
law with modern procedural rules to deal with cross-border features to
protect all the interests involved. Nevertheless, Brazil remains immova-
ble in this aspect.
Unlike the United States, which has enacted chapter 15 to encourage
cooperation among all the parties involved in a more efficient and pre-
dictable way, there is no signal that a similar adoption will happen in
Brazil. Without the enactment of the Model Law, Brazil continues to
have obsolete and unharmonious rules in cross-border situations. There-
fore, the barriers will persist, negatively affecting multinational compa-
nies and creditors, leaving the difficult task to manage it to the courts and
the parties.
Although economic strategy and a political scenario are the central
keys for country development, a combination of these with predictable
and reliable commercial legislation are also crucial for economic and so-
cial growth. Thus, the enactment of the Model Law into domestic legisla-
tion would certainly be an answer for Brazil to complement its insolvency
law. By filling this gap and achieving a deeper international legal harmo-
166. Id.
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nization in bankruptcy matters, Brazil can create further incentives and a
more favorable legal environment for the availability of credit and attrac-
tion of foreign investment into the economy.
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